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The effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the home countries of multinational
corporations (MNCs)havebeen discussed for several years,but the topic has recently attracted
renewedattentionin the internationaldebate, as a result of the regional integration processes in
Europe and North America. The liberalization of trade and factor movements is creating new,
large markets and removing restrictions on where plants can be located. Integration is therefore
expected to alter the pattern of international investment, and cause changes in the industry
structures of both home and host countries.
Thehomecountry effects of FIX are likely to be more important and significant in Sweden
than in most other countries.Afirst reason is that Swedish MNCs occupy a dominantposition
in the Swedisheconomy, accounting for about half of manufacturing employment, which means
that theirdecisionsare likelytohave notable effects on the national economy. A second reason
is that the flows of outward investment have (atleastuntil very recently) been much larger than
flowsofinward investment -thesum of Swedish investment abroad between 1981 and 1990 was2
more than five times larger than inwardFDI(OECD, 1993). The home countryeffects are
therefore not balanced by any large host country effects. Moreover, the boom of Swedish
outward investment during the late 1980s (going mainly to EC countries) provides a current
motive to ask how the foreign investment of Swedish MNCs influence the home country Sweden.
The purpose of this paper is to examine two issues related to foreign investment by Swedish
multinationals: first, the effects of outward foreign direct investment on domestic investment,
exports, and employment, and second, the effects on the domestic economy from the increasing
division of labor between the parents and foreign affiliates of Swedish MNCs. We will
summarize and synthesize the existing empirical evidence on these matters (much of which has
hitherto only been available in Swedish) and discuss some possible long run effects that have not
received much attention in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the motives
for Swedish FDI and provides some descriptive statistics. The third section examines the
evidence on the effects of FDI on Swedish investment, exports, and employment, while the
fourth section focuses on some possible effects on domestic industry structure. There is alsoa
summary and conclusion.
2. The Motives and Pattern of Swedish P1)1
Sweden has a long tradition of foreign direct investment and multinational firms in the
manufacturing sector. The oldest Swedish MNC dates back to the 17th century, and several of
today's leading multinationals had established foreign operations before the first World War.
Eighteen of Sweden's twenty largest MNCs were multinational already three decadesago3
(Swedenborg et al, 1988).
Throughout the history of Swedish Fl)!,themain ownership advantages of the country's
multinationals have been related to technologies based on domestic natural resources. Olsson
(1993) identifies two types of development paths that were emerging already at the beginning of
the 20th century. One group of Swedish multinationals have based their competitiveness directly
on local raw materials, like wood and ferrous metals, and stayed close to their original industry.
Others have built on the long Swedish tradition of metal manufacturing, originally based on the
exploitation of local sources of high quality iron-ore, and upgraded their operations to more
advanced industries, like machinery and transport equipment. This pattern with technology as the
main competive advantage is still discernible, although some firms have subsequently relied
heavily on the sales networks created to exploit some initial technological asset (see Olsson,
1993).
The motives for foreign production have also remained largely unchanged over time.
According to Jordan and Vahlne (1981), Swedish firms have typically established foreign
affiliates to avoid transportation costs and trade barriers and to get closer to their customers.
Close customer relations have been necessary in order to develop products adapted for specific
markets or specific national product standards, and to avoid discrimination of foreign producers
in e.g. public procurement. The foreign operations of Swedish multinationals have seldom been
undertaken to secure access to foreign raw materials, and access to cheap foreign labor has
generally not been an important argument, except in the garment industry after the l960s
(Swedenborg, 1979).
However, some of the motives for FDI in the late 1980s seem to differ from earlier4
periods. A new reason to establish foreign affiliates -industry'sneed to prepare for an
increasingly more likely European Single Market that might exclude Sweden -coincidedwith
reductions in Swedish controls on international capital movements, extremely high liquidity in
Swedish firms, and a strong Krona to create a boom of outward investment.' This boom has had
a significant impact on the overall structure of Swedish FDI, and it may also have changed the
character of some home country effects, as we will discuss later.
Swedish firms with foreign production facilities are concentrated in manufacturing and
include somewhat over a hundred corporations. As Table I shows, these finns dominate the
Swedish manufacturing sector. Domestic MNCs accounted for almost half of Sweden's
manufacturing employment and 90 per cent of commercial R&D expenditures in 1986. There are
no data on their shares of total production, but it may be observed that they have supplied well
over half of Swedish manufacturing exports since 1970. It is also useful to note that the
population of Swedish multinationals is heavily dominated by a relatively small number of large
and old firms. The 20 largest corporations accounted for 90 per cent of the foreign production
and foreign employment of Swedish manufacturing MNCs in 1986; the 10 largest corporations
alone recorded more than 75 per cent of the total (Swedenborg, et al., 1988). Only two new
corporations -IKEAand Tetra Pak -havejoined the "top 20 club" since the 1960s.
--TABLEI HERE --
Table1 also shows that the importance of the Swedish market for the multinationals'
operations is diminishing, and that the firms are gradually becoming more internationalized. The5
Swedishshare of the MNCs' total employment and output (including both parents and affiliates)
fell from about 70 per cent to 60 per cent between 1970and1986. Employment in foreign
production affiliates increased from 182,090 to 259,820 during the same period. The absolute
and relative importance of foreign operations has increased further since 1986, as a result of the
investment boom during the late 1980s -theflow of outward FDI during the 1986-1990 period
was almost five times higher than that in the 1981-1985 period. Preliminary reports using the
latest available data indicate that the total employment of foreign affiliates had reached above
450,000 and the Swedishshare of the MNCs' production had fallen tobelow40 percent by 1990
(Andersson, 1993).
Thesectoraldistribution of the foreign production of Swedish firms in 1970 and 1986 is
presented in Table 2.2 Non-electrical and electrical machinery were the most important sectors
in bothyears,in terms of employment as well as assets (although the relative importance of non-
electrical machinery is declining),but the sharesofpaper products andtransport equipment
increasedsignificantly duringtheperiod. Comparable data on FDI stocks for more recent years
are not available, but information on FDI flows from the Swedish Central Bank suggest that the
shares of pulp and paper, paper products, machinery, and transport equipment industries have
increased since 1986, particularly in the EC region (Andersson and Fredriksson, 1993, p. 44).
--TABLE2 HERE --
Table3 presents some data on the geographical distribution of Swedish FIN in 1970, 1986,
and 1990. The EC countries and the United States were the main locations for Swedish6
investment during this period, although the Latin American share was also relatively high, The
table shows a reduction in the EC share of investment between 1970 and 1986, but a large
increase thereafter. The EC share of employment in Swedish foreign affiliates had increased to
56 per cent by 1990. The employment shaje of North American affiliates has grown
continuously, to 22 per cent in 1990, whereas the shares of EFTA, other developed, and
developing countries have fallen.
-- TABLE3 HERE —
The continuous growth of the foreign operations of Swedish multinationals raises important
questions regarding the impact of outward FDI on Sweden and the Swedish part of the MNCs'
operations. One cause for worry is that there are differences in how the competitiveness of
Sweden, on the one hand, and Swedish multinationah, on the other hand, has developed over
time. Sweden lost more than 20 per cent of its share of world exports of manufactures between
the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, but the export shares of Swedish multinationals (including both
parents and affiliates) increased over the same period (BlomstrOm and Lipsey, 1989). The reason
is that the exports from foreign affiliates have increased faster than theexports from the Swedish
parent companies. Does this suggest that Swedish exports are replaced by goods produced abroad
by Swedish affiliates, and that foreign jobs substitute for Swedish jobs? These questions are
examined in the next section.7
3. Effects on Home Investment, Exports, and Employment
Analyzing the interactions between domestic and foreign operations, Stevens and Lipsey (1992)
divide the topic into two related questions. First, there are financial interactions that come about
because investments in different locations compete for scarce funds, and second, there are
production interactions because FDI may either substitute for home exports or increase home
exports of components and intermediate goods used by the foreign affiliates. It is convenient to
distinguish between these two types of interactions also here.
Financial interactions
In the debate on financial interactions, it is argued that domestic and foreign investment may be
substitutes when the multinationals' capital costs are not constant. If the cost of borrowed funds
increases as the firm becomes more leveraged, then the MNC's alternative projects (foreign and
domestic) will compete for access to relatively cheap internally generated funds. The decision to
invest scarce resources abroad may thus reduce the likelihood for concurrent investments in the
home country, and vice versa. However, restrictions on international capital mobility, vertical
integration, and other complementarities between domestic and foreign production are likely to
dilute this effect, so the degree of substitution is an empirical question. Evidence from the U.S.,
presented by e.g. Stevens (1969), Ladenson (1972), Severn (1972), and Stevens and Lipsey
(1992), suggest that there is in fact some substitution between domestic and foreign investment
by U.S. firms. McClain (19749 argues that the same holds for multinationals from the United
Kingdom, and Belderbos (1992) points to a similar pattern for Dutch MNCs.
There are no published studies on Sweden, but it should be noted that capital market8
regulationslimited the Swedish MNCs' possibilities to finance FIN from Sweden until 1986.
Consequently, thedegree of substitutability between Swedish and foreign investment opportunities
was probablylow before that time. After 1986, the behaviorof Swedish MNCs may have
become more similar to that of multinationals from other countries. In fact, there is an on-going
public debate about whether the low level of domestic investment in the early 1990s is partly due
to the high indebtedness of Swedish multinationals, inherited from the FDI boom of the late
1980s.
Production iñtenctions
Questions regarding the impact of foreign direct investment by Swedish firms on Swedish exports
and employment have had much more prominent positions on the Swedish research agenda, and
there are several detailed studies available. These represent business oriented analyses as well as
econometric studies, which means that there is some variation in methodology and generality of
results. Typically, the more business oriented authors have attempted to examine what would
have happened in specific cases if investment abroad had not been possible, whereas the
econometric studies have tried to detect the overall relationship between Fl)! and exports in
larger samples of firms or industries.
Jordan and Vahlne (1981) is an example of the former approach. They aim to compare the
domestic employment effects of foreign direct investment with alternative ways to exploit the
competitive advantages of a sample of Swedish firms. The alternatives considered are exports
1mm Sweden, licensing, and minority joint ventures, and the analysis attempts to take into
account several factors that may influence Swedish exports and employment in the medium term.9
These include estimates of the market shares that canbecaptured under the alternative strategies,
differencesin .the ability to face and solve customer problems in the relevant markets, flows of
royalties and license payments (which influences the possibilities to undertake R&D), and
differences in related product sales under the alternative strategies.
Jordan and Vahine's overall conclusion is that foreign direct investment has positive effects
on Swedish exports and employment, because the establishment of foreign affiliates typically
leadstolarge increases in the foreign market shares and in exports of intermediate products to
affiliates. Thedrivingforceistheexistence (or fear)ofvarious types oftradebathers that would
limitthe market shares if export was the only available alternative. Moreover, foreign direct
investment is connected with higher royalty and license payments (from affiliates) and higher
exports of related products. Foreign production is judged, by Jordan and Vahine, to be
particularly beneficial for low-technology products with high transportation costs. However, the
results rest on very specific assumptions about export survival rates, i.e. the fractions of the
affiliates' market share that could have been served by home exports. In some cases, for
standardized products, the assumed survival rates are as low as 2 to 8 per cent. In a related
government research report (SOU 1981:33), Vahlne and Solvell study a larger sample of firms
and reach similar results, with the summary conclusion that FDI has been a necessary strategy
for the survival and international competitiveness of Swedish firms.4 Foreign direct investment
has been complementary to Swedish exports and employment, because the alternatives would
have resulted in much lower foreign market shares for Swedish firms.
It is obvious that the assumptions about export survival rates are of central importance for
the outcome, and it is therefore interesting to compare Jordan and Vahlne's (1981) estimates with10
data from other sources. To begin with, it can be noted that many other business oriented case
studies have also been based on very low survival rates. For instance, Stobaugh, et al. (1972),
who study nine U.S. firms, conclude that their entire foreign markets would have been lost
within five years in the absence of FBI. A problem with these studies is that the estimates of
survival rates are often based on surveys and interviews with company officials, who naturally
are interested in "portraying their foreign activities in as favorable a light as possible vis-à-vis
their impact on the domestic economy" (Frank and Freeman, 1978, p. 9)5
An alternative is provided by Frank and Freeman (1978), who set up a model for the U.S.
economy where survival rates are explicitly calculated from data on costs and revenues. The
model yields estimates of survival rates ranging between 20 and 40 per cent depending on
industry. However, they rule out shifts in market size that are "occasioned by the establishment
of a foreign subsidiary" (p. 35), which means that their figures are likely to be on the high side:
the establishment of an affiliate may lead both to shifts in the demand curve and increases in
market shares. They also calculate a short run "break-even" survival rate for the U.S.economy
in 1970, that would lead to equally large export displacement and export stimulus from FDI. This
break-even estimate is 11 per cent (p. 62): foreign direct investment will stimulate domestic
exports if the surviving market shares are smaller, but reduce exports if it is larger. Using their
own best estimates of survival rates, they conclude that foreign direct investment has substituted
for U.S. exports and that the net employment effect of FDI is an annual loss of between 120,000
and 160,000 jobs (p. 62).6 It should be noted that the generality of these results is also
uncertain, since the period under examination may not be representative -thiswas the peak of
the U.S. firms' internationalization process. Still, a Swedish government researchreport (SOU11
1981:43) looking at a FDI project in West Germanymade by thepackaging firm PLM applies
the model on Swedish data. The results suggest a survival rate between 15 and 50 per cent,
which means that the project is likely to substitute for home exports. This stands in sharp contrast
to PLM's management estimates of survival rates close to nil, which imply that the project would
have stimulated Swedish exports.
The problem of assessing survival rates does not usually come up in the econometric
studies. Instead, these typically employ regression analysis to determine the relation between
exports and various firm, industry, and country characteristics -controllingfor as many other
determinants as possible, the focus is on the partial effect of foreign direct investment (measured
e.g. as the stock of foreign assets or the value of foreign production). A negative coefficient for
FDI implies that foreign production substitutes for exports, whereas a positive sign suggests that
complementarity -thestimulus to home exports of intermediate and other related products -is
more important in aggregate. It can be noted that most U.S. studies of this type, including Horst
(1974), Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978), Kravis and Lipsey (1988), and Lipsey and Weiss
(1981 and 1984), conclude that the complementarities have tended to outweigh the substitution
effects. Yet, there are differences between the competitive advantages of Swedish and U.S.
multinationals, .and it may not be possible to generalize results across countries. Moreover, there
is reason to examine the Swedish studies separately, since many of them include interesting
methodological innovations and employ more detailed and disaggregated data than what is
available elsewhere.
The most comprehensive econometric analyses of the Swedish FDI-trade relationship are
presented in Swedenborg (1979 and 1982), Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988), and12
Svensson(1993). The studiesare all based on a detailed data set on Swedish multinationals
collected bythe Industrial Institute for Economic and SocialResearch(IUI) in Stockholm, but
therearesignificant differences in methodology andresults.
Themajor innovation in both of Swedenborg's studies is that she bases her analysis on
2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimations, in order to avoid the bias that comes about because
both foreign production and exports may be affected by the same omitted variables. The first
stageestimatesthe size of foreign production as a function of various firm, industry, and host
country characteristics, and the second stage estimates exports from the Swedish parent company
with the first-stage fitted values of foreign production as one of the independent variables. In
Swedenborg (1979), the focus is on a sample of some 100Swedishmanufacturing MNCs with
more than 300 foreign affiliates in 1974. Her findings suggest that there was no significant
overalleffect of foreignproduction on the exports of Swedish parents that year, but that the
aggregate results hide two significant, but opposite effects. Foreignproduction seemsto substitute
for some exports to sales affiliates and non-affiliated customers in the host country, but there is
a concurrent (larger) positive effect on the exports of goods to producing affiliates (both
intermediates and finished products).7 Swedenborg (1982) adds observations for three moreyears
(1965,1970, and1978), with very similar results. The effect on total export is still not
statistically significant, but there is a clear pattern when complementary and substituting exports
are examined separately. A one dollar increase in foreign production is found to result in a 12
cent increase in exports to producing affiliates, but only a 2 cent fall in exports to other
customers in the host country, i.e. a net export stimulus of 10 cents.
BlomstrOm, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) argue that Swedenborg's results are uncertain13
because her first-stage estimations have low explanatory power, so that much of the relevant
variation in the affiliates' production is neglected in the second stage. They examine Swedish
exports and foreign directinvestmentfor10aggregate industry groups in 1978, as well as
changes between 1970and1978, in a conventional OLS (ordinary least squares) framework. By
focussing on changes in the variables, they hope to eliminate the impact of the omitted variables
that simultaneously affect foreign production and exports, but not those that affect changes in
production or exports. Moreover, they look at total Swedish exports in each industry, rather than
only the parent corporations' exports. This means that they may capture some instances where
the affiliates' activities have substituted for other firms' exports, but also cases where FDI has
facilitated other Swedish firms' exports to the host market. The latter situation may occur if
foreign production familiarizes the host country with Swedish products, or if the affiliates transfer
information about the host country's business environment back to Sweden.
Yet, the findings in BlomstrOm, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) differ little from those
presented by Swedenborg (1979 and 1982). There are no signs of substitution between Swedish
exports and foreign production for any of the industries included -ifanything, the authors find
a larger complementary effect -andthere is no evidence that large foreign production in a
country reduces the country's subsequent imports from Sweden.'
A recent study by Svensson (1993), using unpublished data from the latest survey of
Swedish direct investment abroad (for 1990), challenges the results of the earlier research.
Svensson argues that it is necessary to account for the foreign affiliates' exports to third
countries, because they are likely to substitute directly for parent exports. Doing this, he finds
that there now appears to be substitution between Swedish investment abroad and exports from14
Sweden. However, his results are not comparable to those of the earlier studies. While
Swedenborg (1979, 1982) and Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) examined the effect
of production by Swedish foreign affiliates on the absolute value of exports from Swedish parent
companies or Sweden, Svensson investigates the effect of foreign direct investment on the ratio
between parent exports and the company's (parent plus foreign affiliates) sales. Since foreign
direct investment typically increases the denominator of his dependent variable, there is reason
to expect a negative estimated effect of FDI even if nothing at all happens with parent exports.9
Thus, what he finds is simply that exports from the home country become relatively less
important when the size of foreign operations increases.
We can therefore summarize the Swedish debate on production interactions by noting that
both the business oriented and the econometric studies have found either no effect on home-
country exports, or a somewhat higher level of home-country exports as a result of Swedish
finns' investment abroad. Judging from these results, Swedish ED! does not appear to be
detrimental to Swedish exports. However, it must be noted that the examination of financial and
production interactions leaves out some important aspects of the effects of ED! on the home
country. For a more complete analysis, we must turn our attention to another set of issues that
has been neglected in most studies, until recently: the structural effects that come about because
foreign direct investment influences the composition of home country exports.
4. Effects on the Home Countxy's Industry Structure
The structural effects of foreign direct investment on the home country have received relatively
little attention in the international debate, and the few studies that are available have focussedon15
a limited set of issues. A number of studies have examined the relation between FDI and profits
(or, more generally, market power) in the home country, and concluded that internationalization
typically strengthens the domesticmarketposition and the firm characteristics that made it
possibleto undertake Fl)! inthe first place (see e.g. Cohen, 1972, Pagoulatos and Sorensen,
1976, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran, 1978, Hirshey, 1982, and Benvignati, 1983). The MNCs'
profitability benefits from their ability to "achieve greater vertical integration (utilizing cheap
labourand/or rawmaterials), spread joint costs across a larger base, diversify portfolios across
different economiesandmarkets and reduce tax liabilities"(UN,1993, pp. 73-74). Higher
profits, in mm, stimulate investments in R&D and marketing and enhance the oligopolistic nature
of the industries wheremultinational corporationstypically operate. Other researchers have
discussedtheimpact of foreign direct investment on the composition of domestic labor demand
(see Hawkins, 1972, U.S. Tariff Commission, 1973, and Frank and Freeman,1978).The picture
emerging fromthese studies is thatthereis a shiftin labordemand favoring "white-collar"
employees at the expense of "blue-collar" workers, arguably because multinational firmstendto
exportproductionactivities,while concentrating management, marketing, and R&Datthe home
base.
Only a few Swedish studies have examined this kind of issues in detail -oneexception is
a government research report dealing with effects of investment abroad on the structure of the
Swedish labor force (SOU 1983:16) -butthere is a growing awareness of the importance of
structural effects. The consequences of FDI on the composition of export products -shipments
of intermediate inputs and other complementary products to affiliates replace exports of finished
products to other customers -maywell be more conspicuous than the effects on the total amount16
of exports. Below, we will first discuss what type of Operations the SwedishMNCsare likely
to retain in Sweden, and then try to identify some possible effects of this change in industry
structure.
What type of ptoduction is located in Sweden?
Trade theory proposes that the international division of labor within multinational corporations
(under free trade) should conform to the factor endowments of different production locations (see
e.g. Dunning, 1993). The factor requirements of different stages in the production process vary,
and each separate stage should be located where the most intensively used inputs are most
abundant.
Traditionally, Swedish comparative advantages have been based on natural resources like
timber, ore, and hydro-power, and products developed from these assets continue to be important
in Swedish exports. According to BlomstrOrn, Lipsey and Ohlsson (1990), Sweden's comparative
advantages vis-á-vis other OECD countries are still in products with low and medium R&D
content, many of which are based on the indigenous natural resources. Raw material based
industries (metals, wood products, and paper products) are particularly prominent in Swedish
exports to the EC, whereas imports from the EC are largely made up of engineering products
(machinery, electronics, and transport equipment). This pattern persists even though the R&D
expenditures of Swedish firms (in per cent of value added) have been among the highest in the
world since the mid-1970s.
Theory therefore suggests that the production undertaken at home by Swedish
multinationals should also capitalize on Sweden's comparative advantages and focus on products17
withrelatively lowR&D content. The production of Swedish affiliates located in other
industrialized countries shouldhave some biastowardhigh-tech products (although transport costs
and various types of market imperfections may unsettle the picture). Unfortunately, it is not
possible to test this hypothesis directly. There are no comprehensive data available on the factor
contents in the MNC5' foreign and domestic production, nor is there detailed information on
what specific products parents and affiliates are actually manufacturing.
However, data on intra-firm trade seem to confirm that the division of labor between
parents and affiliates is becoming more accentuated, and that the degree of specialization in home
production is increasing. The intra-firm trade between parents and affiliates has always made up
a large share of the Swedish parents' total exports, but the importance of these flows increased
significantly during the late 1980s, particularly for EC affiliates. About a third of the parent
exports to the six original EC members went to producing affiliates in 1986, but the share had
increased to nearly half by 1990, as shown in Table 4. The rates of increase in intra-firm exports
to affiliates located in the other EC countries were equally large, although from lower initial
levels. At the same time, there were marked changes in the structure of these exports. Whereas
intermediates and finished goods had accounted for roughly 50 per cent each in 1986, the share
of intermediates had grown to nearly 75percent in 1990. The affiliates exports back to Sweden
also increased during the period, to reach almost a fifth of their total sales in 1990 (Andersson,
1993, p. 6).
--TABLE4 HERE —18
Hence, it appears clear that the parentsareconcentrating their efforts on production of
intermediate inputs. Can we say anything at all about the characteristics of these products? For
lack of readily available data on product categories and factor intensities, some authorshave used
information on other aspects of MNC operations to answer the question. Andersson (1993) notes
that the labor productivity of EC affiliates increased at an average annual rate of 5.5 per cent
between 1986 and 1990, while the parents' productivity growth rates were negative. He posits
that this was mainly caused by a shift in the location of the Swedish MNCs' various production
stages. Earlier, most of the value added was produced in the parent company and many affiliates
functioned as relatively simple assembly plants. More recently, he argues, affiliates have taken
over some of the more skill-intensive parts of the production process, and parents have
specialized in simpler, raw material based operations at lower stages in of the value added chain.
Andersson also examines firm level data for the periods 1974-1978 and 1986-1990 in a
regression analysis, and finds a significant negative relation between labor productivity growth
in parents and increases in the share of intermediate goods in the parents' total exports to their
EC affiliates. From this, he concludes that FDI is now leading to an increasing specialization in
raw material based production with relatively low value added.
Given the lack of direct evidence, it is necessary to interpret this conclusion with caution.
Swedish productivity growth may have been low for reasons that have nothing to do with the
division of labor between MNC parents and affiliates -forinstance, the incentives to work hard
have probably been weak in Sweden because of the high income taxes and the compressed wage
structure. It is also possible that imperfections in Swedish markets have motivated MNCs to
move operations abroad, so that the causality runs from events in the home country to MNC19
behavior, rather than the opposite. Yet, it is interesting to note that the only available study of
the employment structure in Swedish MNC5 outlines a picture that is at least partly consistent
with Andersson (1993). Increasing foreign, production in Swedish MNCs was apparently
accompanied by lower, skill requirements in home based production already in the early 1980s -
thelargest MNCs employ a lower share of qualified production workers than Swedish industry
on avenge (SOU 1983:16, p. 172).
In addition to the suspected specialization in intermediates with low value added and high
raw material content, Swedish MNCs have also retained most of their technology production at
home. Over four-fifths of the MNCs' R&D expenditures in 1990 were undertaken in Sweden,
although the affihiates share of R&D had increased slightly since 1986 (Andersson, 1993). The
focus on R&D is also apparent in the MNCs employment structure. The largest MNC5 employ
higher shares of R&D personnel than other Swedish firms (SOU 1983:16, p. 172).
As a result of this concentration of research efforts, Sweden exhibits one of the world's
highest rates of R&D expenditures, along with Japan, Germany, Switzerland and the United
States. However, there seems to be a contradiction between the intensive research efforts and the
large export shares of products with a low R&D content. Why have exports not shifted towards
more R&D intensive products during the past decades? One possible answer is that the MNCs
have not found Sweden to be the most suitable location for their high-tech production -thefruits
of the MNCs' Swedish research efforts have instead been exported for use in foreign affiliates
(see BlomstrOm, 1990, for such an argument).
Thus, the limited evidence we have about what type of production is located in Sweden
suggests a somewhat peculiar pattern. On the one hand, there appears to bea concentration to20
production of intermediates, which, according to some authors, are characterized by relatively
low value added andhighraw material content. On the other hand, there is also a focus on
technology production, which is the area where Swedish MNCs have their firm specific
competitive advantages. It is possible that this peculiar pattern arises only in advanced countries
with abundant natural resources, but not in advanced countries with comparative advantages in
human capital or technology, where the country's and MNCs' advantages are likely to coincide.
Hence, the pattern in Sweden may differ from that in countries that are poor in natural resources,
like Japan, the Netherlands, or Switzerland.
Effects of increasing specialization
The discussion above implies that Swedish multinationals are concentrating their home production
in two areas: R&D and intermediate products. Since the MNCs' location choices are based on
profit maximization, it can be assumed that their decisions reveal that there are private gains to
be made from specialization. It is not equally obvious what the net effects are for Sweden. One
reason is related to the characteristics of markets and production processes. Differences in market
structure allow some industries to charge higher prices and generate larger profits than others,
and differences in technologies mean that some types of production processes are connected with
positive external effects and spillovers. The impact of FDI on the home country may be
beneficial if production processes with high profits and positive externalities are retained at home,
but effects are likely to be less advantageous if these are among the activities that are moved to
foreign affiliates. Another reason is that it is impossible to identify any alternatives to the
continuing internationalization of Swedish multinationals. Would the MNCs be able to retain the21
presentproduction volumes and market shares if they were not allowed to continue the
specialization of their Swedish operations and the expansion of their foreign production, or would
they be outcompeted by foreign rivals?
Consequently, very few studies have examined the home country effects of FDI from this
perspective, and there is no generally accepted notion of what industries are most beneficial, what
kinds of externalities are relevant, how important they are in quantitative terms, and how they
compare with the gains from specialization identified in neo-classicai trade theory. The sole
exception seems to be a consensus that FDI has allowed the Swedish MNCs to grow larger and
spend more resources on R&D than what would otherwise have been possible, and that this has
had a positive impact on the scientific and technological capability of Sweden (see e.g.
Fjálcansson, 1980). Ourdiscussionof the possible long-term effects of increasing specialization
will therefore be rather speculative, and the ensuing paragraphs are perhaps best seen as an
agenda for future research.
The view that the MNCs' decisions to concentrate R&D in the parent company are
beneficial for Sweden is seldom questioned, as noted above, and there is no need to repeat the
well-known arguments for why R&D may be connected with positive externalities. Instead, it is
interesting to note that the recent debate has raised several questions about Sweden's ability to
benefit from. the potential R&D spillovers in the long run.
First, the debate has revealed worries that R&D is also moving abroad, and the foreign
affiliates' share of the Swedish MNCs' total R&D expenditures did indeed increase slighlty
between 1986 and 1990. It is not yet clear whether this is a stable trend (the affiliates' share of
R&D remained more or less stable between 1970 and 1986), but the recent changes call attention22
to questions about what has determined the location of R&D.More specifically, ithas been
argued that R&D has been cheap in Sweden because the salaries of scientists and engineershave
been low compared to other OECD countries (BlomstrOm, 1990). However, low salaries have
also meant that the incentives to invest in higher education are weak, and skilled labor is
becoming more scarce. Sweden has therefore lost its position among the countries with the
highest education and skill levels in manufacturing, and it may be difficult to retain the
comparative advantages in R&D if present trends continue.
A second cause of concern has been the lack of a shift in total Swedish exports toward
more high-tech products during the past decades, in spite of the very high R&D expenditures
(BiomstrOm, Lipsey and Ohlsson, 1990). As discussed earlier, this may indicate that Swedish
research results are not exploited at home, but rather exported to foreign affiliates where
production takes place. The question is then which activities yield the most positive externalities:
production of high technology (i.e. R&D) or high-technology production? This may be a more
general problem than the previous one.
Finally, for Sweden to benefit front the potential R&D externalities, it is necessary that
there is a population of local firms that are able to absorb spillovers (see Kokko, 1992).
However, a concentration of the MNCs' Swedish operations to fewer and perhaps less advanced
intermediates might have a profound impact on thousands of their non-multinational suppliers and
sub-contractors in Sweden. Overall, there is already a downward trend in the number of sub-
contractors, and the share of inputs purchased in Sweden is also falling (Braunerhjelm, 1991).
Further increases in Swedish investment abroad and a continuing specialization of Swedish
operations could enhance this trend, since many of the suppliers and sub-contractors may lack23
the resources to follow the MNCs abroad. This potential effect of FD! on industry structure
therefore raises questions about the possibilities to absorb the spillovers from the MNCs' R&D
efforts in thefuture.
Theconsequences of an increased bias towards production of intermediates, which may be
characterized by low R&D and high raw material content, have only been discussed very briefly
in the Swedish literature, but most of the comments point in the same direction: there are serious
doubts about the advantages of this type of development. One apparent reason for the skepticism
is a worry that the MNCs' decisions about production locations may have been partly motivated
by various market imperfections that have distorted factor prices. This would also render the
resulting division of labor more or less distorted, and motivate policies to remove the
imperfections. In fact, the current unemployment rates -overeight per cent of the labor force
is unemployed and another five to six per cent are engaged in various public programs, to
compare with average unemployment rates of between one and three per cent during the past
decades -testifythat problems of this kind are serious, since all markets do not clear.
However, the possibility that market structure and various types of externalities are
important has also figured in the debate. For instance, Andersson (1993) departs from the
assumption that Swedish MNCs are increasingly specializing in simple raw material based
products, and argues that this is undesirable because there are differences between markets for
simple intermediates and more advanced and differentiated finished goods. For the first group
of products, there is already fierce price competition and the entry of new producers from the
industrializing countries and the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe is likely to add
to the pressure. Continued competitiveness in these industries requires cost reductions and24
perhaps also falling real wages. The markets for advanced finished products, by contrast, are
more oligopolistic, and there are generally higher profits, faster product development, and more
room for increases in real wages. One objection to this assessment is that the exports from MNC
parents to affiliates are intra-firm transactions. The prices and competitive conditions in parallel
arms-lenght markets may not apply, and intra-firm trade may even be an effective way to exploit
domestic raw materials.
Another potential effect of specialization in raw material based intermediates is that the
prices of these products are often more sensitive to changes in business trends than those of
advanced finished products. The case of Finland, where exports have traditionally been much
more biased towards intermediates based on forest products and meta]s than in Sweden, provides
a relevant example (Haavisto and Kokko, 1991). The value of Finnish exports has always
dropped rapidly during the troughs of the international business cycle, and the resulting balance
of payments crises have necessitated recurrent devaluations. In fact, the Finnish ten-year
devaluation cycle (with major devaluations in 1949, 1957, 1967, and 1977-78) is highly
correlated with the major depressions in the European economy during the post-War period.'0
Devaluations have been seen as the only possible policy response, simply because the size of the
export sector has made it imperative to uphold international competitiveness, often at the expense
of other objectives. Income distribution is one of the other goals that has sometimes been
sacriflced, because devaluations typically benefit capital owners at the expense of wage earners.
Hence, there may be cause to be wary about increasing raw material dependence to the extent
that recurrent exchange rate changes (or volatile exchange rates) are contrary to other political
or economic objectives.25
Finally,thereis reason to once again consider the effects of specializationon the sub-
contractorsand suppliers of MNCs. What happens with industry structure if the parent companies
specialize in the production of some of the intermediate inputs used in their final products,and
thereare fewercomponents tobe made in Swedish plants? Are the Swedish suppliers able to
export to Swedish foreign affiliates, or will the motives to engage Swedish suppliers be reduced?
The number of suppliers employed by Swedish MNCs has been falling rapidly over the past
years, as noted earlier. Moreover, few domestic (non-multinational) suppliers and sub-contractors
have the capability to follow the MNCs abroad, as shown by Braunerhjelm (1991). Examining
a sample of 140 Swedish sub-contractors,henotes that only 4 per cent of their output is shipped
to Swedish MNC affiliates abroad, while Swedish MNCs at home account for 43 per cent of their
sales. This implies that a continued division of labor along the lines discussed above - even one
that is successful enough to increase the total employment in Swedish industry - may have a
profound impact on Swedish industry structure, It is conceivable that the present population of
manufacturing firms, which is made up of few large MNCs and thousands of smaller sub-
contractors and suppliers, may be replaced by a structure with an unchanged number of MNCs
(that are perhaps even larger than today) but a significantly lower number of smaller firms.
We already noted that this kind of development might reduce the opportunities to benefit
from R&D-spillovers, but there may be additional effects on e.g. growth rates. It is generally
believed that small and medium sized firms were instrumental in generating economic growth in
the U.S.andthe U.K. during the 1980s, and they have played major roles in the development
of new high-tech industries all over the industrialized world. Recent empirical studies have also
demonstrated that firm growth decreases with firm size and firm age (see. e.g. Evans, 1987;26
Hall, 1987; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989). The link between firm size and growth in
Sweden may be different, but any significant relation provides a motive to think twice about the
possible effects of FDI on the home country's economic structure.
5.Summary and Conclusions
This paper set out to summarize some of the research on the impact of Swedish investment
abroad on Swedish investment, exports, and employment, and to discuss some effects of the
division of labor between MNC parents and foreign affiliates. Reviewing the literature on the
relation between foreign investment and home country exports (and employment), we found that
the net effect seems to be one of complementarity. Foreign production substitutes for some borne
exports of finished goods, but the advantages of market proximity allow the foreign affiliates to
capture a larger market share than what the parent, exporting from Sweden, could achieve. The
resulting increases in the parent's exports of intermediate and related products are large enough
to make up for the lost exports of finished goods.
We also noted that the effect of foreign direct investment on the structure, rather than
volume, of Swedish exports may be important. Instead of shipping finished products to foreign
consumers, MNC parents are increasingly shipping intermediate products to their foreign
affiliates. There are no data on product categories or the factor content of the parents' and
affiliates' production, so it is not possible to draw any conclusions regarding the characteristics
of these intermediates. Yet, some Swedish economists have argued that the division of labor may
entail an increasing specialization of Swedish manufacturing on products with relatively low value
added and low R&D content. In addition, there is a concentration of R&D activities in Sweden.27
Few studies have hitherto examined the effects of FDI via its impact on the structure of
exports, and there is a paucity of relevant information on the topic. Our discussion of the
possible long-term effects of increasing specialization was therefore rather speculative, and
focused on some topics for future research. The questions that were raised concerned the
possibilities to benefit from potential R&D externalities, the impact of an increased raw material
bias on income distribution and exchange rate volatility, and the consequences for industry
structure and growth rates. Some of these effects are potentially important, not only for Sweden
but perhaps also for other home countries of multinational corporations,28
Notes
1. It is useful to note the difference between the Swedish response to European integration and
some North American reactions to NAFTA.Thefear that Sweden would perhaps not join the
European Community contributed to the surge of Swedish investment in EC countries during the
late 1980s. The North American debate in 1993 has revealed concerns about the opposite
reaction, i.e. massive outflows of investment ('the great sucking sound') as Canada and the
United States join NAFTA. This illustrates a fundamental difference between the motives for FDI
in the two regions: Swedish MNCs are still mainly concerned about market access abroad,
whereas North American MNC5 already have access to their most important markets (i.e. their
home markets) and worry more about production costs.
2. Most of the data on Swedish MNCs are from comprehensive surveys conducted by the
Industrial Institute of Economic and Social Research (IUI) in Stockholm. The surveys have been
conducted every fourth year between 1970 and 1990 (except 1982), but detailed information on
the results of the 1990 survey are not available.
3. As quoted by Caves (1982, p. 166).
4. The SOU publications are government committee reports on various topics: the ones referred
to in this paper are all based on investigations by the Direct Investment Committee 1977-1983.
5.Interestinglyenough, the prevailing view of the Swedish labor movement has also been that
FDI is 'necessary and positive for overall the competitiveness of the firms, and generates
spitlover gains to the domestic branches of the corporations" (Hjalmarsson, 1991, p. 256).
6. Another illustration of how results depend on assumptions about export survival rates is given
by U.S. Tariff Commission (1973), where the employment effects of FDI are analyzed.
Assuming 100 per cent survival rates, the Commission estimates that the total impact of U.S.
Foreign direct investment in 1970 was a loss of 1.1 million jobs. Assuming a 50 per cent
survival rate reduces the estimated loss to 400,000 jobs. Finally, the effects are recalculated
under the assumption that U.S. exporters would have maintained the shares of world trade they
held in 1960-1961 (i.e. before the rapid expansion of American investment abroad that took place
during the 1960s). The result is a net job gain of 500,000 U.S. jobs. (See also Frank and
Freeman, 1978, Chapter II.)
7. Swedenborg claims that a one dollar increase in foreign production stimulates 15 cents worth
of exports to the producing affiliate, but substitutes for 9 cents worth of exports to other firms
in the host country (Swedenborg, 1979, pp. 215-217).
8. Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) also include some 2SLS estimates similar to those
of Swedenborg (1979 and 1982). Their 2SLS regression yield somewhat larger positive
coefficients for the effect of foreign production on Swedish exports than what their Ol.S
regressions do. This is contrary to Swedenborg's findings (although the only looked at the
parents' exports from Sweden), and possibly an indication that foreign production may have some29
positiveexternal effects on other Swedish exporters.
9. Apparently, Svensson(1993) hasdivided his original dependent variable (parent exports) with
the size of the MNC in order to avoid heteroscedasticity.
10.Tradewith the Soviet Union exerted a countercyclical effect on Finnish exports after the mid-
1970s, which led to a change in the export structure and reduced volatility during the 1980s, until
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Haavisto and Kokko, 1991). The picture hasnow
reverted to that before the 1980s: consequently, the most recent European depression has forced
a large devaluation.30
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Table 1.
Swedish MNCs and the Swedish Economy: Some Descriptive Statistics.
Manufacturing Manufacturing Industrial
Employment Output R&D
1970 1986 1978 1986 1970 1986
Swedish MNCs'
share of 0.43 0.48 n.a. n.a. 0.70 0.90
Swedish activity
Swedish share
of Swedish 0.69 0.59 0.72 0.61 0.85 0.86
MNCs' activity
Source: Calculated from Swedenborg (1973) andSwedenborg,et al. (1988).35
Table 2.










Food Products I I I I
Textiles 2 1 1 0
PulpandPaper 2 3 7 3
Paper products 2 8 3 11
Chemicals 14 11 8 10
Metals 10 9 13 7
Non-electrical Machinery43 34 43 36
Electrical Machinery 18 22 16 19
Transport Equipment 2 7 4 9
Other 6 4 6
Source: Swedenborg, etal.(1988), Den svenskaindustrins wiandsinvesteringar 1960-1986,
Industrial Institute ofEconomicand Social Research, Stockholm, Table3.4.36
Table 3.




























EFTA 10 8 5 10 8






































EC6 =Belgium,France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands;
EC3 =Denmark,Great Britain, Ireland;
EC12 =EC6+ EC3 + Greece, Portugal, Spain;
EFTA =Austria,Finland, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland (+ Portugal for 1970 and 1986);
Other W. Europe =Greece,Malta, Spain, Turkey;
Other developed =Australia,Japan, New Zealand, South Africa;
NorthAmerika = Canada,USA;
Developing= Africa,Asia,LatinAmerica;
Source: Swedenborg,etal.(1988),Densvenska industrins wiandsinvesteringarJ%O-1 986,
Industrial Institute of Economic and Social Research, Stockholm, Table 3.5, and Andersson
andFredriksson (1993).37
Table 4.
Parent Exports to Producing Affiliatesas a Share of









1974 34.8 15.! 28.8 16.9 17.1 46.4
1978 26.5 17.1 12.2 11.3 23.9 17.0
1986 30.5 12.7 19.8 9.2 14.7 30.7
1990 46.0 23.2 27.0 5.1 17.2
EC6 = Belgium,France, Germany,Italy,Luxembourg,Netherlands;
EC3=Denmark,Great Britain, Ireland;
Other EC = Spain, Portugal, Greece;
EFFA = Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland;
Other OECD = Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
Source: Andersson (1993), Table 3.